Saturday, April 23, 2016

VAKALATNAMA


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
AT PATNA
VAKALATNAMA FOR

NO.                             OF                               2016
                                                                             Appellant
                                                                             Petitioner
Versus
                                                                                 Respondent
                                                                                    Opposite Party
Know all men by those Presents by this Vakalatnama
I/we





Do hereby
Appoint the advocate noted below in the margin or any of them as my/our lawful Advocate in the above-mentioned case for appearing, conducting and arguing the same or depositing or withdrawing any money in connection therewith or putting in papers petition ,etc. on my/our behalf or filling or taking back any document or with drawing suit, appeal or application with permission to institute fresh suit etc. and make compromise and for referring the case for arbitration and for doing all acts that be necessary to be done in connection with said acts. I/WE, further say that any act done by my/our said Advocates or any one of them after accepting this Vakalatnama shall be considered of my/our true and lawful act and shall be binding on me/us.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
To the above effect, I/We execute this Vakalatnama
Dated                                      of                                             2016

  

Friday, April 22, 2016

Free and Compulsory Education. The provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) must be enforced by the State without distinction between the urban and rural....

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 



Chief Justice's Court AFR

Case :- PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) No. - 3334 of 2016

Petitioner :- Ajay Kumar Patel
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Adarsh Bhushan,Arpan Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Nisheeth Yadav

Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.

(Per : Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ) 


These proceedings which have been instituted in the public interest raise a seminal issue in regard to the
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implementation of the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 20091 in relation to students belonging to the economically weaker sections. The submission of the petitioner is that the salutary mandate of Section 12 (1) (c) of admitting at least twenty-five percent students from children belonging to the weaker sections and disadvantaged group in the neighborhood has been defeated by the State Government. The Act was enacted to provide for free and compulsory education to all children of the ages of six to fourteen years. The object of the Act is to implement Article 21 A of the Constitution which provides for free and compulsory education to children between the ages of six to fourteen years. This is a fundamental right guaranteed by Part-III of the Constitution and is to be implemented in such manner as the State may by law determine. 

The expression "school" is defined in Section 2 (n) as follows : 
"school" means any recognised school imparting elementary education and includes- 
(i) a school established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or a local authority; 
(ii) an aided school receiving aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority; 
(iii) a school belonging to specified category; and 
(iv) an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority. 

Section 3 (1) provides for the right to free and compulsory education in a neighborhood school to every child between the ages of six to fourteen till the completion of his or her elementary education. Elementary education is defined in Section 2 (f) to mean education from first class to eighth class. Among the mandatory duties of the appropriate government under Section 8 and of the local authorities under Section 9 is to provide free and compulsory elementary education to every child and to ensure the availability of a neighborhood school as specified in Section 6. Under Section 6, the appropriate Government and local authority are required to establish within such area or limits of a neighborhood, as may be prescribed, a school, where it is not so established within a period of three years from the commencement of the Act. Under Section 8 (c) and Section 9 (c), the appropriate Government and the local authority are obligated to ensure that a child belonging to the weaker section and a child belonging to a disadvantaged group are not discriminated against and prevented from pursuing and completing elementary education on any grounds. The local authority is required under Section 9 (d) to maintain records of children up to the age of fourteen years residing within its jurisdiction, in such manner as may be prescribed and under Clause (e) to ensure and monitor admission, attendance and completion of elementary education by every child residing within its jurisdiction. Section 12 forms a part of Chapter IV which deals with the responsibility of schools and teachers. 
Section 12 (1) (c) provides as follows : 

"specified in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause (n) of section 2 shall admit in class I, to the extent of at least twenty-five per cent of the strength of that class, children belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group in the neighborhood and provide free and compulsory elementary education till its completion: 
Provided further that where a school specified in clause (n) of section 2 imparts pre-school education, the provisions of clauses (a) to (c) shall apply for admission to such pre-school education." 
The expression 'child belonging to disadvantaged group' is defined in Section 2 (d) as follows : 
"child belonging to disadvantaged group" means a child with disability or a child belonging to the Scheduled Caste, the Scheduled Tribe, the socially and educationally backward class or such other group having disadvantage owing to social, cultural, economical, geographical, linguistic, gender or such other factor, as may be specified by the appropriate Government, by notification." 

The expression 'child belonging to weaker section' is defined in Section 2 (e) as follows : 

"child belonging to weaker section" means a child belonging to such parent or guardian whose annual income is lower than the minimum limit specified by the appropriate Government, by notification." 

The rule making power is conferred upon the appropriate Government in Section 38. The expression appropriate Government is defined in Section 2 (a) to mean the Central Government in relation to a school established, owned or controlled by the Central Government or the administrator of a Union Territory, having no legislature. Other than the above, the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to a school established within the territory of the State. 
In exercise of the rule making power conferred by Section 38, the State Government has made the Uttar Pradesh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules 20112, which were notified on 27 July 2011. 
Rule 4 (1) provides for the area or limit of a neighborhood and is in the following terms : 

"4 (1). The area or limit of neighborhood within which a school has to be established by the Committee authorized by the State Government shall be as under : 
a) in respect of children in classes I-V, a school shall be established in habitation which has no school within a distance of 1.0 Km. and has population of at least 300; 
b) in respect of children in classes VI-VIII, a school shall be established in habitation which has no school within a distance of 3.0 Km. and has population of at least 800." 

Rule 7 which deals with the admission of children belonging to the weaker sections and disadvantaged groups is in the following terms : 
"7 (1) The schools referred to in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause (a) of section 2 shall ensure that children admitted in pursuance of clause (c) to section 12 (1) shall not be segregated from the other children in the classrooms nor shall their classes be held at places and timings different from the classes held for the other children. 
(2) The schools referred to in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause (n) of section 2 shall ensure that children admitted in pursuance of clause (c) to section 12 (1) shall not be discriminated from the rest of the children in any manner pertaining to entitlements and facilities such as textbooks, library and Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) facilities, extra-curricular activities and sports. 
(3) The areas or limits of neighborhood specified in rule 4 (1) shall apply to admissions made in pursuance of clause (c) to section 12 (1): 
Provided that the school may, for the purposes of filling up the requisite percentage of seats for children referred to in clause (c) to section 12 (1), extend these limits with the prior approval of the State Government. 
(4) The local authority (Gram Panchayat/Nagar Nigam/Nagar Palika/Nagar Panchayat, as the case may be) shall maintain a name-wise list and record of all children belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group, studying in private and specified category schools under its jurisdiction." 

Under Rule 8, provisions have been made for the grant of admission to children inter alia referred to in Section 12 (1) (c). Insofar is material, sub-rule (1) is in the following terms : 
"The process of admission of children referred to in clauses (b) and (c) of section 12 (1) shall be totally transparent. The detail of such children applying for admission shall be maintained by the school regularly, which shall include the name, address, sex, caste, date of birth of the child and the name, address, occupation and monthly income of father/mother/guardian, detail of whether child belongs to weaker section or disadvantaged group. Such information shall be made public through website. Out of the total applicants, all the children who applied for admission, but not admitted for whatsoever reason, shall be informed in writing with the reason thereof. It shall also be binding for the school to follow the process of admission prescribed by the State Government from time to time." 


The Government Order dated 20 June 2013 has been amended on 24 February 2016 in certain respects. 
In the writ petition, it has been stated that out of a total 56.53 lac enrollments of students for Class 1 in primary schools in the State of Uttar Pradesh, 6.37 lac enrollments representing a quota of 25% prescribed under Section 12 (1) (c) should have been filled up but as on 5 June 2015, only 2817 admissions were confirmed to have been granted under the said provision. 
The grievance of the petitioner, when the petition was entertained on 27 January 2016 was two fold. Firstly, it was submitted on the basis of the Government Orders dated 3 December 2012 and 6 January 2015 that the District Basic Education Officers have been directed that it is only where no seat is available in government schools or aided institutions that the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) would apply. Secondly, it was submitted that as a result of an artificial distinction between the urban and rural wards, Section 12 (1) (c) is being applied only to urban wards with the result that the rural population is not obtaining the benefit of the provision. On both these aspects, this Court directed the Secretary, Basic Education to file a short counter affidavit. 
Accordingly, the Secretary, Basic Education has responded to the directions of this Court. The Secretary, Basic Education states that the submission of the petitioner that 25% of the seats in unaided private schools in Class 1, out of a total of 6.37 lac enrollment should be filled up from students from the specified groups is only a statistical calculation. In the view of the Secretary, Basic Education, this cannot be construed as a target. According to the counter affidavit, the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) do not abrogate the responsibility of the appropriate Government as prescribed in Section 6. Dealing with the two specific issues which have been raised by the petitioner, the affidavit of the State clarifies that there is no distinction between the rural or urban areas in the relevant Government Orders. The relevant averments in the affidavit are as follows : 
"13. That considering the provision of Section 12 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 in the Uttar Pradesh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 and in the relevant Government orders there is no distinction in the Rural or Urban Areas. In so far as the office order dated 06.01.2015 issued by the Director of Education Basic is concerned it does not restrict the admissions of children belonging to the disadvantaged group and weaker section in the neighborhood schools to urban areas only, but considering the unavailability of space for establishing new government schools or non-availability of schools run by the Basic Education Board the District Basic Education Officers were given directions that in the urban wards in which the schools run by the Basic Education Board are not available the students/ children belonging to the weaker section and disadvantaged group be given admission in the unaided private schools.... It is submitted that the Government Order dated 3.12.2012 does not make any distinction between rural and urban areas for coverage of the said act." 

The first issue which falls for consideration relates to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c). Section 12 defines the nature of the responsibility of a school to provide for free and compulsory education. Section 12 (1) (c) covers schools belonging to specified categories and unaided schools not receiving any grant or aid to meet expenses from the Government or local authority. These schools have been obligated to admit to Class 1 to the extent at least 25% of the strength of that class, children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups in the neighborhood and to provide free and compulsory elementary education till its completion. The mandate of Section 12 is not conditional on the absence of schools established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or local authority or of aided schools. In other words, the obligation to admit students belonging to the weaker sections and from disadvantaged groups does not come into existence only upon the absence of seats in schools which are run by the State or local authority or by aided institutions. The obligation under Section 12 (1) (c) has not been made dependent on the non existence of State run schools or aided schools or the unavailability of seats in those schools. To read Section 12 (1) (c) in a contrary manner so as to import an obligation to admit students from the weaker sections and disadvantaged groups only where seats are not available in State run schools or aided institutions would be to defeat the object of the provisions. The Government Order dated 6 January 2015 reiterates the earlier Government Order dated 3 December 2012 by stipulating that it is only where the District Basic Education Officer has found that students belonging to weaker sections or disadvantaged groups are unable to obtain admissions to government schools or schools run by the Basic Shiksha Parishad and in aided institutions due to unavailability of seats that such students would be entitled to obtain admission against the 25% seats available in unaided institutions. This prescription creates a hierarchy in the availment of the benefits under Section 12 (1) (c) by stipulating that it is only in the absence of admissions being available in Government run schools or aided institutions that the obligation to admit students from disadvantaged groups or of weaker sections under Section 12 (1) (c) would arise. This interpretation and understanding of the State is clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c). 
Moreover, it is evident that the rules which have been prescribed by the State Government under the rule making authority do not establish any such hierarchy as indeed the rules could not have done in violation of the provisions of the parent enactment. Consequently, we find merit in the first submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that laying down a hierarchy or condition for the availment of the benefits under Section 12 (1)(c) by restricting them only to a situation where admissions in schools which are conducted by the Government or in aided institutions are not available, would be contrary to the plain mandate of Section 12 (1) (c). Such a policy cannot be laid down by the State Government in violation of the provisions of the Act of Parliament and would be ultra vires. The plain effect of the policy would be to mandate that a child belonging to the weaker section or disadvantaged groups cannot aspire for admission to an unaided institution under Section 12 (1) (c) so long as admissions are available in State run schools or in aided institutions. This is impermissible. It is a matter of common knowledge that the facilities which are provided in unaided institutions are superior to those in government institutions and aided institutions though may be with certain exceptions. The whole object and purpose of Section 12 (1) (c) was to provide for an assimilation of students belonging to the weaker sections and disadvantaged groups into the main stream of education by allowing them access to facilities and means of learning provided in unaided institutions. Unfortunately, as a result of the policy which has been framed by the State Government to which we have made a reference earlier, this object has been negated by depriving the most deserving of students from the grant of benefits which have been provided by the legislation enacted by Parliament in implementation of the fundamental right to free and compulsory education between the ages 6 and 14. 
On the second aspect of the matter, we are equally of the view that it would be impermissible for the State
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Government to postulate, as a matter of policy, that the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) will be applicable only to the urban as distinct from rural areas. Neither the Act nor the Rules make any such distinction. There can be no plausible justification whatsoever to restrict the ambit of the provisions made under Section 12 (1) (c) to the urban areas by depriving the rural population access to better education facilities in primary education. The Secretary, Basic Education has in his counter affidavit clarified that there is no distinction as such between rural and urban areas but, considering the unavailability of space for establishing new Government schools or non availability of schools run by the Basic Education Board, the District Basic Education Officers were given directions that in the urban wards in which the schools run by the Board are not available, students/children belonging to the weaker sections or disadvantaged groups be given admissions in unaided private institutions. If the aforesaid formulation of the State Government is intended to be inclusive by emphasizing the need to grant admissions to the groups covered by Section 12 (1) (c), there can be no objection. However, this formulation cannot be read in an exclusionary manner so as to confine the benefits of Section 12 (1) (c) only to students who are pursuing education in urban areas as distinct from rural areas. The provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) must be enforced by the State without distinction between the urban and rural areas. 

During the course of hearing, one aspect which has emerged before the Court is the failure of the Principal Secretary, Basic Education to deal specifically with the number of admissions granted across the State under Section 12 (1) (c). Apart from controverting the statement made by the petitioner, by submitting that Section 12 (1) (c) is not a target, no specific disclosure of statistics has been made before the Court. The State Government shall ensure that the provision is implemented in letter and spirit in the State of Uttar Pradesh from the coming academic session. The State shall do so in accordance with the basic interpretative principles that must govern the implementation of Section 12 (1) (c) in the State as enunciated in this judgment. The State shall now revisit its earlier formulations so as to bring them in conformity with the mandate of Section 12 (1) (c) as interpreted in the present judgment of this Court no later than within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 
The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 
Order Date :- 1.3.2016 
RK 
(Yashwant Varma, J) (Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ) 

Correction of date of birth;...at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth for all purposes..

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

Chief Justice's Court AFR

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 160 of 2016

Appellant :- State Of U.P. And 3 Ors.
Respondent :- Tej Ram Kashyap
Counsel for Appellant :- Vivek Shandilya
Counsel for Respondent :- Abhay Raj Singh

Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.
(Per : Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ) 

This special appeal has arisen from a judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2015. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and has directed the correction of his date of birth in the service record of the Irrigation Department of the State Government as 15 February 1959 in place of 15 February 1956. 
The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition at the stage of preliminary hearing, without calling for a counter affidavit from the State on the basis that in view of the "undisputed facts and the documents on record" the petition would be decided without the defence of the State being placed on the record. 
The respondent was appointed as a helper in the Irrigation Department on 1 November 1978. The application submitted by the respondent for appointment indicates that he was 22 years of age and had failed at the High School examination. The age of the respondent was entered in his service book as 15 February 1956. The date of entry in the service book is 17 February 1984 and bears the thumb impression of the respondent together with his signature. On 22 June 2004, the respondent submitted an application to the effect that his date of birth has been wrongly recorded as 15 February 1956 instead and in place of 15 February 1959. In support thereof, the respondent relied upon a certificate issued by the Principal of the Rajkiya Inter College, Bareilly dated 29 March 1990 indicating that the date of birth of the respondent in the records of the institution is 15 February 1959. The certificate indicates that the respondent had appeared at the High School examination in 1978 which he cleared but the institution has still not received the High School certificate from the Secondary Education Board. 
The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has relied upon the circumstance that the identity card of the respondent issued by the Irrigation Department mentions his date of birth as 15 February 1959 and that the High School certificate which was produced by the respondent before the Court indicated the date of birth as relied upon by the respondent. 
The learned standing counsel has urged that at the time of preparation of the service book, the respondent had duly signed the entry which indicated that his date of birth was recorded as 15 February 1956. The learned Single Judge rejected the submission by holding that the respondent is still in service and has been agitating his claim for correction of his date of birth since 2004. For these reasons, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the correction of the date of birth from 15 February 1956 to 15 February 1959. 
At the outset it would be material to refer to the provisions of the U.P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 19741. 
Rule 2 provides as follows: 
"2[2. Determination of correct date of birth or age. -The date of birth of a Government servant as recorded in the certificate of his having passed the High School or equivalent examination at the time of his entry into the Government service or where a Government servant has not passed any such examination as aforesaid or has passed such examination after joining the service, the date of birth or the age recorded in his service book at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth or age, as the case may be, for all purposes in relation to his service, including eligibility for promotion, superannuation, premature retirement or retirement benefits, and no application or representation shall be entertained for correction of such date or age in any circumstances whatsoever.]" 

Rule 2 indicates that the date of birth which has been recorded in the High School certificate or in respect of an equivalent examination, shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth for all purposes in relation to his service. Where a government servant has not passed the High School or equivalent examination as aforesaid, the date of birth or age recorded in the service book at the time of his entry into government service, shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth. Rule 2 further provides that where a Government servant has passed the High School examination after joining the service, the date of birth or the age recorded in his service book at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth or age, as the case may be, for all purposes in relation to his service. 
In the present case, the application submitted by the respondent when he entered upon service indicates that he had disclosed his age to be as 22 years and that he had failed in the High School examination 'High School Anuttirna'. The respondent joined services on 1 November 1978. The case of the respondent himself is that he had initially failed in the High School examination and that he appeared in the supplementary examination which he cleared. Now, when the respondent submitted an application on 22 June 2004, the first thing that needs to be noticed is that it was addressed to the competent authority in the Irrigation Department nearly twenty six years after he had joined the service. 
In the meantime, as we have noted, the service book of the respondent reflected his date of birth as 15 February 1956 and it bears both the signature and thumb imprint of the respondent. Hence, the respondent was aware of the fact that his date of birth has been entered as 15 February 1956. This also tallies with his disclosure in his application seeking employment which indicates that his age was 22 years in 1978. This application, it may be noted, was in terms of the form prescribed under the standing orders applicable under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. Even when the respondent submitted his application for correction of the date of birth on 22 June 2004, he relied upon a certificate of the Principal of the Inter College dated 29 March 1990 which, while stating that the respondent had passed the High School examination in 1978 and that his date of birth in the records of the institution was 15 February 1959, stated that the institution had not received a copy of the High School certificate from the Secondary Education Department. 
The case can be considered from either of two stand points. Firstly, as a general principle, it is well settled that an application for correction of the date of birth in the service record, made belatedly and a long time after the employee had entered into service, should not be entertained. This principle must apply to the facts of the present case, where as we have noted, the respondent himself declared his age as 22 years when he sought employment in 1978 and his service book was completed in 1984, duly endorsed by the respondent indicating that his date of birth was 15 February 1956. Twenty six years thereafter, the respondent sought correction of his date of birth. His submission that he had submitted his High School certificate when he joined service is clearly belied by his own statement made in his application for employment that he failed in the High School examination at that stage. Equally significant in the present case, is the principle which is contained in Rule 2 of the statutory rules which have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 2 provides that in the first instance a date of birth of a Government servant as recorded in the certificate of his having passed the High School or equivalent examination at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth for all purposes in relation to service. Where a Government servant has not passed the High School examination or an equivalent examination, the date of birth or age recorded in the service book at the time of entry in the service is to be taken for all purposes as the correct date of birth. Rule 2 also provides that in a situation where an employee has passed the High School examination after joining the service, the date of birth entered at the time of his entry in service or age recorded in the service book at the time of his entry into Government service shall be treated as the correct date of birth. 
In this background, both on facts as we have indicated and having due regard to the provisions of law noted above, the learned Single Judge was manifestly in error in entertaining the writ petition and in directing the grant of relief for correction in the date of birth of the respondent from 15 February 1956 to 15 February 1959. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained in the first phase having been filed in 2015, for seeking correction in the date of birth. When the writ petition was filed, the respondent was virtually on the eve of his retirement. A long time after the respondent had entered into service, a correction in the date of birth in the service record ought not to have been entertained. 
We, accordingly, allow the special appeal and set aside the impugned order and judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2015. In consequence, the writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. 
There shall be no order as to costs. 
Order Date :- 29.2.2016
RK
(Yashwant Varma, J) (Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ)


C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.51714 of 2016
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 160 of 2016
***
Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.

The delay of forty four days in filing the special appeal is condoned since sufficient case has been shown in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application.
The application is, accordingly, disposed of.
Order Date :- 29.2.2016
RK
(Yashwant Varma, J) (Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ) 

Nature of live-in relationship....... !!

Duration of relation, shared household, and pooling of resources are some of the guidelines the Supreme Court has framed for bringing live-in relationship within the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' for a protection of women under Domestic Violence (DV) Act.
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A bench of Justice K S Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose said though the eight guidelines are not exhaustive, these will definitely give some insight into such relationships.

Framing guidelines for determining live-in relations, the bench said that pooling of financial and domestic arrangements, entrusting the responsibility, sexual relationship, bearing children, socialization in public and intention and conduct of the parties are some of the other criteria to be considered for determining the nature of relations between parties.


For duration of period of a relationship, the bench said section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression "at any point of time", which means a "reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation."

Similarly, it said the guideline of pooling of resources and financial arrangements meant "supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long-term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, may be a guiding factor".

The bench said domestic arrangements where there is entrustment of responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or up-keeping the house are indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
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The guidelines include a presence of sexual relationship and children which mean, "Marriage like relationship refers to the sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for an emotional and intimate relationship, for the procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc.

"Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication."

The apex court passed the verdict while adjudicating the dispute between a live-in couple where the woman had sought maintenance from the man after the relationship came to an end.