Friday, April 22, 2016

Correction of date of birth;...at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth for all purposes..


HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

Chief Justice's Court AFR

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 160 of 2016

Appellant :- State Of U.P. And 3 Ors.
Respondent :- Tej Ram Kashyap
Counsel for Appellant :- Vivek Shandilya
Counsel for Respondent :- Abhay Raj Singh

Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.
(Per : Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ) 


This special appeal has arisen from a judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2015. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and has directed the correction of his date of birth in the service record of the Irrigation Department of the State Government as 15 February 1959 in place of 15 February 1956. 
The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition at the stage of preliminary hearing, without calling for a counter affidavit from the State on the basis that in view of the "undisputed facts and the documents on record" the petition would be decided without the defence of the State being placed on the record. 
The respondent was appointed as a helper in the Irrigation Department on 1 November 1978. The application submitted by the respondent for appointment indicates that he was 22 years of age and had failed at the High School examination. The age of the respondent was entered in his service book as 15 February 1956. The date of entry in the service book is 17 February 1984 and bears the thumb impression of the respondent together with his signature. On 22 June 2004, the respondent submitted an application to the effect that his date of birth has been wrongly recorded as 15 February 1956 instead and in place of 15 February 1959. In support thereof, the respondent relied upon a certificate issued by the Principal of the Rajkiya Inter College, Bareilly dated 29 March 1990 indicating that the date of birth of the respondent in the records of the institution is 15 February 1959. The certificate indicates that the respondent had appeared at the High School examination in 1978 which he cleared but the institution has still not received the High School certificate from the Secondary Education Board. 
The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has relied upon the circumstance that the identity card of the respondent issued by the Irrigation Department mentions his date of birth as 15 February 1959 and that the High School certificate which was produced by the respondent before the Court indicated the date of birth as relied upon by the respondent. 
The learned standing counsel has urged that at the time of preparation of the service book, the respondent had duly signed the entry which indicated that his date of birth was recorded as 15 February 1956. The learned Single Judge rejected the submission by holding that the respondent is still in service and has been agitating his claim for correction of his date of birth since 2004. For these reasons, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the correction of the date of birth from 15 February 1956 to 15 February 1959. 
At the outset it would be material to refer to the provisions of the U.P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 19741. 
Rule 2 provides as follows: 
"2[2. Determination of correct date of birth or age. -The date of birth of a Government servant as recorded in the certificate of his having passed the High School or equivalent examination at the time of his entry into the Government service or where a Government servant has not passed any such examination as aforesaid or has passed such examination after joining the service, the date of birth or the age recorded in his service book at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth or age, as the case may be, for all purposes in relation to his service, including eligibility for promotion, superannuation, premature retirement or retirement benefits, and no application or representation shall be entertained for correction of such date or age in any circumstances whatsoever.]" 

Rule 2 indicates that the date of birth which has been recorded in the High School certificate or in respect of an equivalent examination, shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth for all purposes in relation to his service. Where a government servant has not passed the High School or equivalent examination as aforesaid, the date of birth or age recorded in the service book at the time of his entry into government service, shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth. Rule 2 further provides that where a Government servant has passed the High School examination after joining the service, the date of birth or the age recorded in his service book at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth or age, as the case may be, for all purposes in relation to his service. 
In the present case, the application submitted by the respondent when he entered upon service indicates that he had disclosed his age to be as 22 years and that he had failed in the High School examination 'High School Anuttirna'. The respondent joined services on 1 November 1978. The case of the respondent himself is that he had initially failed in the High School examination and that he appeared in the supplementary examination which he cleared. Now, when the respondent submitted an application on 22 June 2004, the first thing that needs to be noticed is that it was addressed to the competent authority in the Irrigation Department nearly twenty six years after he had joined the service. 
In the meantime, as we have noted, the service book of the respondent reflected his date of birth as 15 February 1956 and it bears both the signature and thumb imprint of the respondent. Hence, the respondent was aware of the fact that his date of birth has been entered as 15 February 1956. This also tallies with his disclosure in his application seeking employment which indicates that his age was 22 years in 1978. This application, it may be noted, was in terms of the form prescribed under the standing orders applicable under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. Even when the respondent submitted his application for correction of the date of birth on 22 June 2004, he relied upon a certificate of the Principal of the Inter College dated 29 March 1990 which, while stating that the respondent had passed the High School examination in 1978 and that his date of birth in the records of the institution was 15 February 1959, stated that the institution had not received a copy of the High School certificate from the Secondary Education Department. 
The case can be considered from either of two stand points. Firstly, as a general principle, it is well settled that an application for correction of the date of birth in the service record, made belatedly and a long time after the employee had entered into service, should not be entertained. This principle must apply to the facts of the present case, where as we have noted, the respondent himself declared his age as 22 years when he sought employment in 1978 and his service book was completed in 1984, duly endorsed by the respondent indicating that his date of birth was 15 February 1956. Twenty six years thereafter, the respondent sought correction of his date of birth. His submission that he had submitted his High School certificate when he joined service is clearly belied by his own statement made in his application for employment that he failed in the High School examination at that stage. Equally significant in the present case, is the principle which is contained in Rule 2 of the statutory rules which have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 2 provides that in the first instance a date of birth of a Government servant as recorded in the certificate of his having passed the High School or equivalent examination at the time of his entry into the Government service shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth for all purposes in relation to service. Where a Government servant has not passed the High School examination or an equivalent examination, the date of birth or age recorded in the service book at the time of entry in the service is to be taken for all purposes as the correct date of birth. Rule 2 also provides that in a situation where an employee has passed the High School examination after joining the service, the date of birth entered at the time of his entry in service or age recorded in the service book at the time of his entry into Government service shall be treated as the correct date of birth. 
In this background, both on facts as we have indicated and having due regard to the provisions of law noted above, the learned Single Judge was manifestly in error in entertaining the writ petition and in directing the grant of relief for correction in the date of birth of the respondent from 15 February 1956 to 15 February 1959. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained in the first phase having been filed in 2015, for seeking correction in the date of birth. When the writ petition was filed, the respondent was virtually on the eve of his retirement. A long time after the respondent had entered into service, a correction in the date of birth in the service record ought not to have been entertained. 
We, accordingly, allow the special appeal and set aside the impugned order and judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2015. In consequence, the writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. 
There shall be no order as to costs. 
Order Date :- 29.2.2016
RK
(Yashwant Varma, J) (Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ)


C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.51714 of 2016
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 160 of 2016
***
Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.

The delay of forty four days in filing the special appeal is condoned since sufficient case has been shown in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application.
The application is, accordingly, disposed of.
Order Date :- 29.2.2016
RK
(Yashwant Varma, J) (Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJ) 

Nature of live-in relationship....... !!

Duration of relation, shared household, and pooling of resources are some of the guidelines the Supreme Court has framed for bringing live-in relationship within the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' for a protection of women under Domestic Violence (DV) Act.
www.legalfreedom.in

A bench of Justice K S Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose said though the eight guidelines are not exhaustive, these will definitely give some insight into such relationships.

Framing guidelines for determining live-in relations, the bench said that pooling of financial and domestic arrangements, entrusting the responsibility, sexual relationship, bearing children, socialization in public and intention and conduct of the parties are some of the other criteria to be considered for determining the nature of relations between parties.


For duration of period of a relationship, the bench said section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression "at any point of time", which means a "reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation."

Similarly, it said the guideline of pooling of resources and financial arrangements meant "supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long-term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, may be a guiding factor".

The bench said domestic arrangements where there is entrustment of responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or up-keeping the house are indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
www.legalfreedom.in

The guidelines include a presence of sexual relationship and children which mean, "Marriage like relationship refers to the sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for an emotional and intimate relationship, for the procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc.

"Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication."

The apex court passed the verdict while adjudicating the dispute between a live-in couple where the woman had sought maintenance from the man after the relationship came to an end.

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

आधार कार्ड की अनिवार्यता सरकारी योजना का लाभ लेने के लिए जरूरी नहीं

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने फिर कहा है कि किसी भी सरकारी योजना का लाभ लेने के लिए आधार कार्ड जरूरी नहीं  है। अदालत ने केंद्र सरकार से कहा है कि वह इस बारे में राज्य सरकारों को लिखित निर्देश दे कि सुप्रीम कोर्ट के अंतरिम आदेश का पालन किया जाए।

कोर्ट ने कहा कि हमारे आदेश का उल्लंघन नहीं होना चाहिए अन्यथा कोर्ट सख्ती बरतेगा। कोर्ट में एक याचिका दायर कहा गया कि सुप्रीम कोर्ट के साफ आदेश के बावजूद कुछ राज्य आधार कार्ड को कई सरकारी सेवाओं में जरूरी कर रहे हैं।


अदालत ने 23 सितंबर 2013 में अपने अंतरिम आदेश में आधार की अनिवार्यता खत्म करने का आदेश दिया था।

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने “IT एक्ट“ की धारा-66A को असंवैधानिक घोषित किया

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने अभिव्यक्ति की स्वतंत्रता को बरकरार रखने वाले अपने एक ऐतिहासिक फैसले में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने साइबर कानून की उस धारा को निरस्त कर दिया जो वेबसाइटों पर कथित अपमानजनक सामग्री डालने पर पुलिस को किसी व्यक्ति को गिरफ्तार करने की शक्ति देता था। सोच और अभिव्यक्ति की स्वतंत्रता को आधारभूत बताते हुए जस्टिस जे चेलमेश्वर और जस्टिस आर एफ नरीमन की बेंच ने कहा, 'आईटी ऐक्ट की धारा 66 से लोगों की जानकारी और अभिव्यक्ति की स्वतंत्रता का अधिकार साफ तौर पर प्रभावित होता है।' कोर्ट ने 66 को अस्पष्ट बताते हुए कहा कि किसी एक व्यक्ति के लिए जो बात अपमानजनक हो सकती है, वह दूसरे के लिए नहीं भी हो सकती है।
आज खचाखच भरे अदालत के रूम में फैसला सुनाते हुए जस्टिस नरीमन ने भी कहा कि यह धारा (66 ) साफ तौर पर संविधान में बताए गए अभिव्यक्ति की स्वतंत्रता के मौलिक अधिकार को प्रभावित करता है। इसको असंवैधानिक ठहराने का आधार बताते हुए कोर्ट ने कहा कि प्रावधान में इस्तेमाल 'चिढ़ाने वाला', 'असहज करने वाला' और 'बेहद अपमानजनक' जैसे शब्द अस्पष्ट हैं क्योंकि कानून लागू करने वाली एजेंसी और अपराधी के लिए अपराध के तत्वों को जानना कठिन है। बेंच ने ब्रिटेन की अलग-अलग अदालतों के दो फैसलों का भी उल्लेख किया, जो अलग-अलग निष्कर्षों पर पहुंचीं कि सवालों के घेरे में आई सामग्री अपमानजनक थी या बेहद अपमानजनक थी।

बेंच ने कहा, 'एक ही सामग्री को देखने के बाद जब न्यायिक तौर पर प्रशिक्षित मस्तिष्क अलग-अलग निष्कर्षों पर पहुंच सकता है तो कानून लागू करने वाली एजेंसियों और दूसरों के लिए इस बात पर फैसला करना कितना कठिन होता होगा कि क्या अपमानजनक है और क्या बेहद अपमानजनक है।' बेंच ने कहा, 'कोई चीज किसी एक व्यक्ति के लिए अपमानजनक हो सकती है तो दूसरे के लिए हो सकता है कि वह अपमानजनक नहीं हो।' सुनवाई के दौरान एनडीए सरकार द्वारा दिए गए आश्वासन को खारिज कर दिया कि इस बात को सुनिश्चित करने के लिए कुछ प्रक्रियाएं निर्धारित की जा सकती हैं कि सवालों के घेरे में आए कानून का दुरुपयोग नहीं किया जाएगा।

सरकार ने यह भी कहा था कि वह प्रावधान का दुरुपयोग नहीं करेगी। बेंच ने कहा, 'सरकारें आती और जाती रहती हैं, लेकिन धारा 66 सदा बनी रहेगी।' इसने कहा कि मौजूदा सरकार अपनी उत्तरवर्ती सरकार के बारे में शपथ पत्र नहीं दे सकती कि वह उसका दुरपयोग नहीं करेगी। बेंच ने हालांकि आईटी ऐक्ट की अन्य धाराओं 69 और धारा 79 को निरस्त नहीं किया और कहा कि वे कुछ पाबंदियों के साथ लागू रह सकती हैं। धारा 69 किसी कंप्यूटर संसाधन के जरिए किसी सूचना तक सार्वजनिक पहुंच को रोकने के लिए निर्देश जारी करने की शक्ति देती है और धारा 79 में कुछ मामलों में मध्यवर्ती की जवाबदेही से छूट का प्रावधान करती है।

शीर्ष अदालत ने कई याचिकाओं पर सुनवाई करते हुए अपना फैसला सुनाया, जिसमें साइबर कानून की कुछ धाराओं की संवैधानिक वैधता को चुनौती दी गई थी। इस मुद्दे पर पहली जनहित याचिका साल 2012 में विधि छात्रा श्रेया सिंघल ने दायर की थी। उन्होंने आईटी अधिनियम की धारा 66 में संशोधन की मांग की थी। यह जनहित याचिका दो लड़कियों शाहीन ढाडा और रीनू श्रीनिवासन को महाराष्ट्र में ठाणे जिले के पालघर में गिरफ्तार करने के बाद दायर की गई थी। उनमें से एक ने शिवसेना नेता बाल ठाकरे के निधन के बाद मुंबई में बंद के खिलाफ टिप्पणी पोस्ट की थी और दूसरी लड़की ने उसे लाइक किया था।

प्रताड़ित करने और गिरफ्तारी की कई शिकायतों के मद्देनजर 16 मई 2013 को सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने एक परामर्श जारी किया था, जिसमें कहा गया था कि सोशल नेटवर्किंग साइटों पर आपत्तिजनक टिप्पणियां पोस्ट करने के आरोपी किसी व्यक्ति को पुलिस आईजी या डीसीपी जैसे वरिष्ठ अधिकारियों से अनुमति हासिल किए बिना गिरफ्तार नहीं कर सकती। शीर्ष अदालत के इस साल 26 फरवरी को अपना फैसला सुरक्षित रख लेने के बाद धारा 66 के कथित दुरुपयोग को लेकर एक और विवादास्पद मामला चर्चा में आया जिसके तहत गत 18 मार्च को फेसबुक पर समाजवादी पार्टी के वरिष्ठ नेता आजम खान के खिलाफ कथित तौर पर आपत्तिजनक सामग्री पोस्ट करने को लेकर एक लड़के को गिरफ्तार कर लिया गया था। सुप्रीम कोर्ट में इस बारे में एक याचिका दायर की गई थी, जिसमें आरोप लगाया गया था कि उसके परामर्श का उल्लंघन किया गया। इसके बाद अदालत ने उत्तर प्रदेश पुलिस से इस बात को स्पष्ट करने को कहा था कि किन परिस्थितियों में लड़के की गिरफ्तारी की गई।

Monday, October 14, 2013

ACID ATTACKS AND THE LAW



ACID ATTACKS AND THE LAW
Since no special section in the Indian Penal Code deals with acid attacks, the incidents are not even recorded separately. Section 326 of the I.P.C, which deals with causing grievous hurt by throwing of a corrosive substance etc. is insufficient/ inadequate to deal with the issue. Firstly, the definition of grievous hurt is not broad enough to cover the various kinds of injuries which are inflicted during acid attacks. Secondly, the section does not cover the act of administering acid. Thirdly, the section gives a wide discretion to the courts as far as punishment is concerned. The cases on acid attacks in India show that normally inadequate punishment is awarded in these cases. Fourthly, the section in the I.P.C does not punish the intentional act of throwing of acid if no injuries occur. Lastly, the section also does not specify who the fine should be awarded to. We also feel that if a person has thrown or administered the acid on another person a presumption should be raised against the person, who has thrown or administered the acid, that he has done so deliberately.

ACID ATTACKS - A GHASTLY CRIME

Apart from the above we feel that the distribution and sale of Acid should be banned except for commercial and scientific purposes. Acid should be made a scheduled banned chemical which should not be available over the counter. The particulars of purchasers of acid should be recorded. We have also examined the various laws in different countries relating to compensation for criminal injuries. While the U.K Act provides for the setting up of a scheme, the Canadian statute sets up a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board to dispense compensation to victims of violence. The suggestion of the National Commission for Women for setting up a board specifically for acid victims has also been examined by us. We however feel that since not only victims of acid attacks but other victims of different crimes also need compensation for rehabilitation, like victims of rape, a law should be enacted to set in place Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards at the Centre, State and District levels in our country.

1. We therefore propose that a new section 326A be added to the Indian Penal Code. The proposed Section 326 A will read as  follows-

326 A. (i) Hurt by acid attack- Whoever burns or maims or disfigures or disables any part or parts of the body of a person or  causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or administering acid to that person, with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such injury or hurt, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description which shall not be less than 10 years but which may extend to life and with fine which may extend to Rs. 10 Lakhs. Provided that any fine levied under this section shall be given to the person on whom acid has been thrown or administered.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

Minimum Imprisonment of 10 years extendable upto imprisonment for life and fine–cognizable– non-bailable—triable by court of session—noncompoundable. (ii) Intentionally throwing or administering acid- Whoever throws acid on, or administers acid to, any person with the intention of causing burns or maiming or disfiguring or disabling or causing grievous hurt to that person shall be liable to imprisonment of either description for a term not less than 5 years but which may extend to 10 years and with fine which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakh.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

1. Minimum Imprisonment of 5 years extendable upto 10 years and fine– cognizable– non-bailable—triable by court of session—noncompoundable.

2. We further propose, for the reasons stated above, that in cases of acid attack a presumption be incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act as Section 114B. The proposed Section 114B of the Indian Evidence Act shall read as under.

Section 114 B: Presumption as to acid attack-If a person has thrown  acid on, or administered acid to, another person the court shall presume that such an act has been done with the intention of causing, or with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause such hurt or injury as is mentioned in Section 326 A of the Indian Penal Code.

3. We propose that a law known as “Criminal Injuries Compensation Act” be enacted as a separate Law by the government . This law should provide both interim and final monetary compensation to victims of certain acts of violence like Rape, Sexual Assault, Acid Attacks etc. and should provide for their medical and other expenses relating to rehabilitation, loss of earnings etc. Any compensation already received by the victim can be taken into account while computing compensation under this Act.

4. We further recommend that the distribution and sale of acid be strictly regulated and the sale of Acid across shop counters be banned.

(As described in the report of justice AR. Lakshmanan, the Chairman, Law Commission of India)